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What is a world? How many worlds are there? What is in common to all 
possible worlds? Is there a point to which everything that is can be reduced? 
And finally, is it possible for a world to perish, in what sense can a world 
come to its end? We will discuss these questions from the standpoint of el-
ementary set theory supported by first–order logic. 
1. Set
Set is a fundamental mathematical concept which means that we do not 
define it. It is considered that the meanings of such concepts are simply self–
evident. Although we do not define the set itself we know how to distinguish 
one set from the other — we differentiate sets by their elements (members). 
So every set is determined by its elements, and (if sets are properly given) 
for every object it should be clear whether it is a member of some particular 
set (or not). Sets are usually denoted by capital letters and their members are 
placed inside of braces. Every object is an element of some set. If an object x 
is a member of certain set S, we symbolize that as xS. 
Definition 1 A set S1 is a subset of a set S2 (S1 S2 ) iff1 every member of S1 
is also a member of S2.
Definition 2 A set S1 is equal to a set S2 (S1 S2 ) iff S1 is a subset of S2 and 
S2 is a subset of S1. 
Therefore, sets are equal iff they have identical members.
Axiom 1 There is a set S which contains no members (Sx (xS)).2
* Slavenka Tokić, Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus — Centre for Croatian Stud-
ies, University of Zagreb, Croatia
1 IFF = if and only if; A if and only if B means that A is true only if B is true and B is true 
only if A is true. So there is no A without B and no B without A.
2 Axioms are propositions that we accept as true, although we do not prove them. Perhaps 
we could choose to demonstrate the existence of such set, e.g. as intersection of two sets 
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We call this set the empty set and we use the symbol  to designate it.
Corollary 1 Empty set is a subset of every set (def. 1)3
Theorem 1 There is only one empty set.
Proof: From the definition 1 it follows that there is no set (other than the 
empty set itself) which is a subset of Consequently, there can be no set 
equal to the empty set (def. 2).4
Example 1  A, B, C, D, E, F and G are some sets:
A= {3, 2, 1, 4} E= {x: x is a capital of some European state}
B= {x: xℕ  x 5} F= {Ljubljana, Rome, Wien, Zagreb}
C= {2, 4, 6, 8, 10...} G= {1, k, Tuesday, ship}
D= {xxℕx 0}
As we can see, sets can be finite and infinite (C). Example of two equal 
sets are A and B. D is the set of all natural numbers less than zero. Since 
there is no such natural number, we can conclude that D is the empty set. 
Further, sets E and F are in a subset relation (FE). G is also one very inter-
esting set; it is obvious that members of different sets can be various, but we 
can also place some unrelated objects into the same set. In these cases it is 
just important to list all elements or the set will not be properly given. So, 
there can be no such set as {1, k, Tuesday, ship…} because it is not evident 
which additional objects could belong to that set.5 
Next we will show how this elementary set theory can be related to a 
theory of worlds.6
with no common elements, but it is very important for us to stress that the empty set does 
not presuppose the existence of any other set; moreover, we will show that every other set 
is built on the assumption of its existence. Hence, if there is any set at all, then there must 
be also the empty set.
3 We can ask ourselves how every member of  is a member of any other set when we know 
that the empty set has no members. But if we converse the question, and ask whether 
there is any member of  which is not in every other set, it is clear that there is no such 
object and therefore the empty set is truly a subset of every set. Logicians would say that 
the proposition xS (x  xS) is true because the antecedent of this implication is 
necessarily false.
4 Perhaps it remains unclear, what is really so special about the empty set? For example, is it 
not so that the set of natural numbers is also a unique one? Of course it is, but the empty 
set is the only set with no members, and there are infinitely many one, two, three (etc.) 
member sets. It is also evident that there are infinitely many sets which share the cardinal-
ity of ℕfor instance — set of all even numbers, set of all primes, set of all integers ...
5 We could object to this condition of “set clarity” for if we, for example, want to establish 
the set of all big trees, it is not obvious which tree would belong to that set and which 
would not. Does that mean that it is impossible to have such set? No, but it does mean that 
we would need a proper definition of a big tree. Obviously, here the problem does not arise 
so much from the set concept itself, rather from the lack of other terms’ definition.
6 More on the key concepts of the set theory (intersection, union, cardinality ...) can be 
found in: 
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2.  World
Definition 3 A world is:
 a) a set of first–order objects — domain (D), and
 b) a set of all true propositions regarding elements of D (T)
Logic differentiates many classes of objects and when we speak of first–
order objects we think of concrete entities — of this Socrates, of this chair, 
of this particular tree.7 A question remains, is it possible that any set of 
objects constitutes a world? If we accept such a standpoint, we also accept 
the idea that there are many subworlds of one world, which in some way 
helps us to better understand reality, but on the other hand leaves us at risk 
of constituting a whole world from every single object. Now, concerning 
condition b, it is most certain that the set of all true propositions must be 
wider than it is suggested. For instance, statements like Plato wrote dialogues 
on Socrates’ teaching or Courage is a virtue are definitely true for this world 
although neither Plato, nor Socrates are any longer its elements and some-
thing as courage cannot even be a member of such determined domain. So 
we will consider this as one working definition. Nevertheless, we can accept 
that each world is a set of certain objects which are bearers of some distinct 
characteristics, but it is evidently much more than just that. We have listed 
necessary conditions for something to be called a world, however they are 
not sufficient.
Example 2
a) D = {Socrates, Plato, Aristotle}
 T = {Socrates is a publisher, Plato supports democracy, Aristotle follows 
Plato’s teaching, Socrates is immortal but Plato and Aristotle are not ...}
b)  D = {x: x is human}
 T = {Everyone is happy, Everyone is healthy, Everyone helps someone, 
Someone helps everyone, Everyone is a friend of everyone ...}
These are examples of two very distant, but possible worlds. The first 
world is a simple one, it contains only three elements and members of the 
second world are all objects with an attribute of being human. We have left 
 — Lipschutz, Seymour: Set Theory and Related Topics (Schaum’s Outline Series), 
McGraw–Hill Companies 1998 (2nd ed.)
 — Bezhanishvili, Guram; Landreth, Eachan: An Introduction to Elementary Set Theory, 
http://www.cs.nmsu.edu/historical–projects/Projects/20920110331SetTheoryRevised.pdf 
(30.01.2013)
7 Second–order objects are considered to be properties and a third– or higher–order object 
is a property of a property. However, to make our point we will have to stay on this basic 
interpretation.
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all these sets of true propositions unfinished, but it is also possible to reduce 
properties of one world to some finite number and then specify which mem-
bers of D are the holders of some particular characteristic and which are 
not. For instance, we could assign only one possible property to the second 
domain — e.g. being happy and then the entire T could be reduced to the 
sentence Everyone is happy. But this would also mean that, in this world, the 
only accidental characteristic of people is happiness. 
Axiom 2 There are no two identical elements of D.
Therefore, if some objects x and y are elements of one world’s domain 
then it necessarily follows that x  y. Likewise, if some particular Socrates 
is an element of the world P, there can be no replication of him in that same 
world, but there is no obstacle for this Socrates to be a member of many 
other worlds. 
This has brought us to the question of world plurality. By the definition 
itself, we are inclined to think that there can be more than just one world. 
For example, there could be two worlds with exactly the same set of objects 
but differing in the part of their true properties (e.g. in this world this table 
is brown, but in some other world it can be green, but still the same object). 
We will take a stand that there is only one existing world E (which does not 
necessarily have to be the case) and numerously (even infinitely) many pos-
sible worlds — P1…Pn (of course, this existing world is also a possible one). 
However, it is obvious that E is in persistent change concerning conditions 
a and b (e.g. people are getting born and die; sometimes we are reasonable, 
sometimes we are not). So it seems natural to conclude that the existing 
world is not some constant, rather it always becomes one of P1 to Pn and it is 
in every moment some other P (although repetition is not excluded).8 
Further, all objects included in these possible worlds are in fact mem-
bers of some (super)set S of all possibly existing things, and every P (con-
sidering a) is a subset of that set. Now, we are particularly interested in one 
such subset (and we do know that it is a subset of S for it is a subset of every 
8 When we speak about contemporary views of possible worlds, names of three philoso-
phers should definitely be mentioned — David Lewis (1941—2001), Alvin Plantinga and 
Saul Kripke. Simplified, the position of Lewis is that every possible world is also an exist-
ing one (modal realism); on the other side, Plantinga and Kripke consider that there is only 
one existing world (this actual one) and possible worlds are just our mind constructions of 
how things could have been or could be (actualism). Suitable introduction to the theories 
of possible worlds can be found in:
 — Loux, Michael J.: Metaphysics A contemporary introduction; London, New York: Rout-
ledge 2002 (2nd ed.)
 — Yagisawa, Takashi: Possible Objects, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/
possible–objects (30.01.2013) 
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conceivable set) — , the empty set. Can the empty set become the set of 
objects for the existing world? 
Before we try to answer this question we will take a look is there some-
thing what unites all these possible worlds no matter how different they 
actually are.
3.  Natural numbers as a “natural” domain
We are going to introduce a common language for propositions of all worlds 
— the language of first–order logic (we will use abbreviation FOL).9 This 
language is constructed of the following symbols: 
Symbol(s) Meaning Example
a, b, c…v, a1, b1, c1…v1, 
a2…
(individual constants)
first–order objects a can stand for (this) 
Aristotle, s for (this) Socrates 
and further –
p: Plato
s1: Seneca
w, x, y, z, w1 , x1, y1, z1, 
w2…
(individual variables)
arbitrary first–order 
objects (they are 
bounded by quantifiers)
A, B, C...A1, B1, C1...A2…
(predicate letters)
properties
(properties can be 
defined concerning one 
or more objects) 
Hx: x is healthy
H1xy: x is helping y
Hp  (Plato is healthy.)
H1ap (Aristotle is helping 
Plato.)
 followed by variable
(existential quantifier)
some property holds for 
at least one member of 
the domain
xHx (Someone is healthy.)
yH1yp (Someone is helping 
Plato.)
 followed by variable
(universal quantifier)
some property holds 
for every object of the 
domain
xHx (Everyone is healthy.)
yzH1yz (Someone is 
helping everyone.)
 (negation) absence of some 
property; negation of 
sentence
Hp (Plato is not healthy.)
9 For further insights on the language of first–order logic:
 — Bergmann, Merrie; Moor, James; Nelson, Jack: The Logic Book, New York: McGraw–Hill 
Companies 2004 (4th ed.)
 — Brachman, Ronald J.; Levesque, Hector J.: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 
San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers 2004; slides from the book are available on-
line at:
 http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hector/PublicKRSlides.pdf (30.01.2013.),
 http://www.informatik.uni–leipzig.de/~brewka/lehre1/FOL.pdf (30.01.2013.)
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& (conjunction) and, but, although… Hp & H1ap (Plato is not 
healthy but Aristotle is 
helping him.)
 (disjunction) or H1ap  H1pa (Either Aristotle 
is helping Plato or Plato is 
helping Aristotle.)
 (material conditional) if…then y(Hy  xH1xy) (If there 
is anyone who is not healthy, 
then there is someone 
helping him.)
 (material 
biconditional)
if and only if (if p then 
q and if q then p) — IFF
H1ap H1pa (Aristotle is 
helping Plato if and only 
if Plato is also helping 
Aristotle)
Definition 4 In the language of first–order logic a set of propositions is satis-
fiable iff there is an interpretation on which all members of the set are true.10
As we have pointed out, FOL uses small and capital alphabetical letters 
as symbols. When we give to those letters certain meaning, we give one pos-
sible interpretation of some sentence stated in that formal language.11 
Corollary 2 Every world is a satisfiable set of propositions.
Since every world is one interpretation on which all propositions of the 
set are true (def. 3, b), it is evident that every world is also a satisfiable set.
Theorem 2 “If F is satisfiable, it is satisfiable in the domain of natural 
numbers.”12
This is one formulation of so–called Löwenheim–Skolem theorem.13 Al-
though, in original text, F stands for a formula of the FOL, to us it will desig-
10 This means that a set is satisfiable if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it. For 
instance, the set {Everyone is happy, Socrates is not happy} is not a satisfiable one.
11 One sentence of the FOL can be interpreted in many ways, e.g. Cs can stand for Socrates is 
courages, but it can also stand for Aristotle is reasonable. So it is very important to specify 
the interpretation of the used letters. Vice–versa, one proposition of the natural language 
can be translated into FOL in different ways but it is important not to use the same letter 
to designate different properties (or objects) of the same world (although different letters 
can symbolize one property or object). 
12 Van Heijenoort, Jean: From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–
1931; Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press 1967, 253. 
13 Leopold Löwenheim (1878—1957), German mathematician, originally stated this theo-
rem: “If a domain is at least denumerably infinite, it is no longer the case that a first or-
der fleeing equation is satisfied for arbitrary values of the relative coefficients.” (Ibid. 235.) 
Slightly converted that would mean: “If a first order proposition is satisfied in any domain 
at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain.” (Ibid., 293.) Thoralf Skolem 
(1887—1963), Norwegian mathematician, improved Löwenheim’s research and proved 
the theorem using axiomatized set theory. One version of his reformulation of the theorem 
is: “A (denumerable or nondenumerable) sum of infinitely many first–order propositions ei-
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nate a set. It is proven that the theorem holds for the sets of first–order propo-
sitions without identity.14 Since there are no two identical objects in any of 
our worlds (axiom 2), there are no obstacles for us to apply it. This means 
that every single domain of these worlds is corresponding to the set of natural 
numbers and for each of these worlds we can construct an interpretation, us-
ing natural numbers as our domain, on which they remain satisfiable. 
Example 3
We will show how this principle works on the worlds introduced in 
example 2:
a) 
Proposition (Possible) FOL 
translation
(Possible) interpretation for D=ℕ
Socrates is a 
publisher.
Ps s: seven
Px: x{y: y = 2z–1 & zℕ} 
(x is odd)
Seven is odd.
Plato supports 
democracy.
Sp p: four
Sx: x{y: y=2z & zℕ} 
(x is even)
Four is even.
Aristotle follows 
Plato’s teaching.
Fap a: ten
Fxy: x > y 
(x is greater than y)
Ten is greater than four.
Socrates is 
immortal, 
but Plato and 
Aristotle are not.
Is & (Ip & Ia) Ix: x{yℕ: (z) [(zℕ & z  1 & y  z)  
y/z ℕ]} 
(x is a prime)
Seven is a prime, but four and ten are not.
b) 
Proposition (Possible) FOL 
translation
(Possible) interpretation for D=ℕ
Everyone is 
happy.
xHx Hx: x  x+1 
Each natural number has its immediate 
successor.
ther is not satisfiable at all or is already satisfied in denumerably infinite domain for certain 
values of the relative symbols that occur in the propositions.” (Ibid. 260)
14 Due to the complexity of this proof we will not demonstrate it here. Proofs of slightly dif-
ferent (more general) theorems which are, however, applicable to this one are presented in 
the cited book (Van Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel). Appropriate online recourse for the 
proof:
 Shapiro, Stewart: Classical Logic, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/logic–
classical/ (30.01.2013.) 
Slavenka Tokić: World as the Empty Set DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA
62
Everyone is 
healthy.
xH1x H1x: x  x+1
Each natural number has its immediate 
successor.15
Everyone helps 
someone.
xyH2xy H2xy: x×y = z, z{2w: wℕ}
For each xℕ there is yℕ such that x 
multiplied by y is equal to some even 
number.16
Someone helps 
everyone.
xyH2xy There is some xℕ which multiplied by any 
natural number is equal to some even number.
Everyone is 
a friend of 
everyone.
xyFxy Fxy: x+y = y+x
For each two natural numbers x,y— x plus y is 
equal to y plus x.
Now we have seen how each possible world can be understood as some 
reflection of natural numbers, yet it is left to show how the empty set makes 
this whole story complete.15 16
4.  Natural numbers as a reflection of the empty set
First of all it is important to differentiate  from {}. Former is the empty 
set (which contains no elements) and the latter is the set containing the 
empty set as its member. So {} is one member set and more than just that, 
{} is the one itself. 
As we previously mentioned, every natural number has its immediate 
successor (for one that is two, for two — three; generally, successor of n is 
equal to n+1.). Even more, we define natural numbers as a collection of 
these successors (and one).17 In words of the set theory we can formulate the 
successor function as s(n) = {n}.18 Therefore, every natural number is actu-
ally a set containing its predecessor as the element.19 
15 See note 11.
16 Obviously, y can be any even number (and if x is even, y can be any natural number).
17 Italian mathematician and logician Giuseppe Peano (1858—1932) defined natural num-
bers through several axioms. One version of these axioms is:
 1. 1ℕ
 2. x (xℕ  x+1ℕ) If x is an element of ℕ , its successor is also an element of ℕ . 
 3. x (x ℕ  x+1) One is not successor of any natural number. (One is the first ele-
ment of ℕ.)
 4. xy ((x,y ℕ & x+1 = y+1) x=y) Each element of ℕ has its own successor.
 5. S (S  ℕ &1S & x (xS  x+1S)) S = ℕ)The last axiom (the axiom of math-
ematical induction) insures that every subset of ℕ which shares that same characteristics 
is actually the set of natural numbers. 
18 Guljaš, Boris: Matematička analiza 1&2, http://web.math.pmf.unizg.hr/~guljas/skripte/
MATANALuR.pdf (30.01.2013), 2.
19 Set notation of natural numbers hails from Hungarian mathematician John (János) Von 
Neumann (1903—1957). Ordinal numbers were his basis. Thus, in his symbolization 
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Example 4
s (1) = s ({}) = {{
s (2) = s ({{
s (6) = s ({{{{{{
ℕ = {{}, {{}}, {{{}}}, {{{{}}}}...}
We have identified every natural number, except one, as a successor of 
some other natural number. So there is no 2 without 1, there is no 3 without 
2. By simple syllogism it follows that there is no 3 without 1, and there is no 
any other natural number without 1. 
And finally, what is one? One is the first natural number, and the only 
number without a predecessor. {} carries the code of all existence — the 
empty set.
5.  For the end (and a beginning)
What does this all mean when we say that the world is coming to its end, 
when we imply that everything will just disappear, that reality is going to be 
reduced to the empty set? If that is about to happen, and our interpretation 
of the world is worth something, it simply means that everything is coming 
back to its origin, to its source and cause of existence.
If we are about to say that this origin is God himself, it definitely doesn’t 
entail the reduction of God to nothing, but indicates that there is no part in 
Him, it indicates how He actually could create something out of nothing, 
and of course, if theorem 1 is worth something, it undoubtedly indicates that 
there is only one God. 20
1={}, 2 = {,{}}, 3={{},{{}}} …
 Generally, s(n) = n  {n}. 
20 Background of the illustration has been downloaded from: http://www.derkleinegarten.
de/800_lexikon/825_symbole/jesus_christus/auferstehung_lamm_gottes_hirte_fisch_sieg-
er_schlange.htm (30.01.2013)
Slavenka Tokić: World as the Empty Set DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA
64
Summary 
WORLD AS THE EMPTY SET
The article discusses how the empty set reflects reality. Every possible world is 
observed as a set of objects which are holders of various properties. By applying 
the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, every world is reduced to the set of natural 
numbers. Furthermore, it is shown that each natural number can be presented 
as a reflection of the empty set. Finally, the empty set concept is used to support 
some basic ideas of neoplatonic and Christian philosophy.
KEYWORDS: empty set, world, Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, natural numbers, 
creatio ex nihilo, God
